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2007]
KNOX v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR:
THE POTENTIALLY RISKY BUSINESS OF
INTERPRETING ASBESTOS STATUTES
I. INTRODUCTION
Before learning of the serious health risks asbestos poses, vari-
ous industries used asbestos as insulation due to its usefulness as a
pliable, flame and acid resistant material.' The resulting health
risks from exposure to asbestos, including lung cancer and lung dis-
ease, are generally referred to as "asbestos disease." 2 Unfortunately,
the lung cancer form of asbestos disease known as mesothelioma
may remain undetected for many years after asbestos exposure,
thereby complicating the causation element of a litigation claim. 3
Asbestos is found in the most unsuspecting workplaces and has
a potentially dangerous ripple effect that can endanger family
members of the employees exposed. 4 To help prevent further ex-
posure to the potentially deadly asbestos disease, the Clean Air Act
(CAA) includes a whistleblower provision.5  In general, the
whistleblower provision protects employees who take part in a "pro-
tected activity," a term that is defined according to the particular
danger that is to be prevented. 6 With respect to asbestos, the
whistleblower provision specifically protects employees who report
the existence of asbestos in the workplace and whose employers un-
1. See Asbestos Resource Center, What is Asbestos?, http://www.asbestosre-
source.com/asbestos/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2007) (providing information on asbes-
tos, asbestos disease, asbestos litigation and products commonly containing
asbestos). These products include "thermal insulation, fire proofing, electrical in-
sulation, building materials [and] brake linings." Id.
2. See Asbestos Resource Center, Asbestos Disease, http://www.asbestosre-
source.com/disease/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2007) (describing harmful effects of two
common forms of asbestos disease, non-cancerous asbestosis and cancerous
mesothelioma).
3. See id. (stating possibility for mesothelioma to be undetectable for years
after exposure). Latency time is "ten to sixty years." See id.
4. See Asbestos Resource Center, Asbestos Exposure: Occupations at Risk,
http://www.asbestosresource.com/asbestos/exposure.html (last visited Jan. 17,
2007) (listing wide range of trades subject to asbestos exposure).
5. See 42 U.S.C. § 7622(b) (2006) (providing statutory requirements for em-
ployees filing whistleblower suits); see also Knox v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 434 F.3d
721, 724 (4th Cir. 2006) (citing Sasse v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 409 F.3d 773, 779 (6th
Cir. 2005)) (explaining that whistleblower provision provides employees right to
sue employers who retaliate against employees engaging "in [I protected activity").
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fairly retaliate through wrongful discharge or employment
discrimination. 7
In Knox v. United States Department of Labor (Knox)," the Fourth
Circuit carefully considered the appropriate standard that should
be applied in determining whether an employee's action is a pro-
tected activity in an asbestos lawsuit.9 The court concluded that the
standard should be one of reasonable belief that asbestos was, or
was likely to be, "emitted into the ambient air" due to the existence
of work practice standards and not of proper conveyance of the
reasonable belief to the employer. 10 In concluding that William T.
Knox (Mr. Knox) was engaged in a protected activity, the court ex-
plained that the Administrative Review Board's (ARB) determina-
tion that the employee's action was not a protected activity was
based on an incorrectly applied standard."
This Note examines the proper standard to apply when deter-
mining whether an employee's action is a "protected activity" under
the CAA's whistleblower provision.12 Section II discusses the facts
the Fourth Circuit considered in reaching its conclusion in Knox.'3
Section III provides the following: (1) the background information
on the CAA and the purpose of the whistleblower provision; (2) the
Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) right to establish work
practice standards; (3) the procedural posture in bringing a claim
for a violation of the whistleblower provision; and (4) the appropri-
ate standard to apply in finding whether an employee is engaged in
a "protected activity."'1 4 Section IV details the Fourth Circuit's ex-
amination of the case.' 5 Section V examines the quality of the
7. See id. (prohibiting discharge against employees). The whistleblower provi-
sion also prohibits discrimination "with respect to [] compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment." Id.
8. 434 F.3d 721 (4th Cir. 2006).
9. See id. at 723-25 (trying to reach proper standard by considering rationales
behind differing conclusions of Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) and Administra-
tive Review Board (ARB)).
10. See id. at 725 (concluding that Mr. Knox's observance of asbestos was pro-
tected activity).
11. See id. at 725 n.4 (finding ARB violated its duty to use reasoned decision-
making under APA).
12. See 42 U.S.C. § 7622(a) (2006) (providing statutory requirements for em-
ployee's actions to be considered protected activity).
13. For a further discussion of the facts of Knox, see infra notes 18-33 and
accompanying text.
14. For a further discussion of the CAA and the whistleblower provision, see
infra notes 34-84 and accompanying text.
15. For a further discussion of the Fourth Circuit's examination of Knox, see
infra notes 85-108 and accompanying text.
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court's reasoning and analysis leading to its conclusion. 16 Finally,
Section VI contemplates the impact the court's decision will have
on future CAA whistleblower cases. 17
II. FACTS
The United States Department of the Interior (DOI) employed
Mr. Knox as a training instructor, whose duties entailed acting as a
"safety officer" at the National Park Service Job Corps Center (the
Center).' 8 In December 1999, Mr. Knox first became aware of the
asbestos in the Center's buildings when a United States Department
of Labor Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
officer performed a safety inspection of the Center.' 9 Thereafter,
Mr. Knox discovered an asbestos report from 1983 and an OSHA
"Notice of Unsafe or Unhealthful Conditions" issued after an in-
spection earlier that year in January 1999.20 Upon making such
findings, Mr. Knox made several reports to his employer's manage-
ment team about the asbestos problem from January 2000 to March
2000.21 After his first report, the management team "threatened to
reduce his job duties and pay," and in response to the threats, he
filed actions under the CAA's whistleblower provision. 22
Shortly after filing the whistleblower actions, the director of
the Center fired Mr. Knox; however, he promptly rescinded the dis-
charge upon finding that the discharge was based on improper in-
formation on the status of Mr. Knox's employment.23 Within one
month of his reinstatement, Mr. Knox filed an action with an Ad-
ministrative LawJudge (ALJ) who found that his employer violated
the CAA's whistleblower provision.24 The employer appealed the
16. For a further discussion of the court's analysis in Knox, see infra notes 109-
31 and accompanying text.
17. For a further discussion of the impact of the Knox decision, see infra notes
132-44 and accompanying text.
18. See Knox v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 434 F.3d 721, 722-23 (4th Cir. 2006) (provid-
ing specific information on plaintiff's employment situation).
19. See id. (showing plaintiffs awareness of asbestos in workplace).
20. See id. (evidencing notice given to employer of asbestos in buildings).
21. See id. at 723 (explaining first step taken by employee to report asbestos
problem).
22. See id. (showing that Mr. Knox specifically filed actions with Merit Systems
Board, DOI Office of Special Counsel and DOI Secretary).
23. See Knox, 434 F.3d at 723 (explaining that employer mistakenly believed
Mr. Knox was probationary employee and not permanent employee when firing
Mr. Knox). After learning that Mr. Knox was a permanent employee, his employer
reinstated Mr. Knox and removed references to discharge from his records. See id.
24. See 42 U.S.C. § 7622 (2006) (enumerating situations in which employees
are protected against unlawful discharge or discrimination and explaining proce-
dure for filing suit against employer). The present claim reached the ALJ, who
2007] 265
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ALJ's judgment and brought the case to the Administrative Review
Board (ARB), which rejected the ALJ's decision.2 5
Although the ARB heard and acknowledged Mr. Knox's testi-
mony that he observed asbestos near an exhaust fan, which he rea-
sonably believed released asbestos into the "ambient air," it
nonetheless dismissed Mr. Knox's claim after finding that he was
not involved in a protected activity. 2 6 The ARB based its rejection
of the claim after considering the following issues: (1) applying a
heightened standard of properly conveying the release of asbestos
into the ambient air, or "air external to buildings," and not the reg-
ularly accepted standard requiring "reasonable belief' of asbestos
release and (2) strictly interpreting the CAA's use of the phrase
"release into ambient air" as air necessarily having to be emitted
"external to buildings" and not in the workplace. 27 Therefore, be-
cause Mr. Knox believed the ARB incorrectly found his actions to
fall outside the scope of protected activity, he objected to the ARB's
decision to dismiss. 28
In accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),
Mr. Knox filed a petition for review with the Fourth Circuit to ex-
amine the ARB's unfavorable decision. 29 The APA specifically re-
quires an administrative agency to apply the "clearly understood
legal standard that [the administrative agency] enunciates in princi-
ple," thereby exercising "reasoned decisionmaking."30 Accordingly,
the Fourth Circuit accepted Mr. Knox's petition to determine
decided that the employer violated the CAA whistleblower provision when its
agents retaliated against an employee engaged in a "protected activity." See id.
25. See Knox, 434 F.3d at 724 (providing procedural history of case to show
differences in opinion regarding whistleblower claims and definition of "protected
activity").
26. See id. at 723 (providing ARB's reason for refusing Mr. Knox's claim).
27. See United States v. Grace, 455 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1175 (D. Mont. 2006)
(citing United States v. Pearson, 274 F.3d 1225, 1234 n.l1 (9th Cir. 2001)) (noting
that "ambient air" excludes indoor air); see also id. (citing Train v. NRDC, 421 U.S.
60, 65 (1975)) (analyzing states' responsibility in complying with CAA standards
and defining "ambient air" as "the statute's term for the outdoor air used by the
general public"); Knox, 434 F.3d at 724 (explaining why ARB did not consider Mr.
Knox's actions "protected activity" under CAA).
28. See Knox, 434 F.3d at 724 (providing Mr. Knox's argument that ARB's stan-
dard was incorrect).
29. See id. at 723-24 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A)-(E) (2006)) (stating procedu-
ral steps, beginning with administrative proceedings and then proceeding to fed-
eral court proceedings, if necessary). "Federal courts can overturn an
administrative agency's decision only if it is 'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of dis-
cretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law,' or 'unsupported by substan-
tial evidence.'" Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A)).
30. See id. (discussing standard that administrative agencies should apply in
exercising reasoned decisionmaking).
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whether the ARB applied the appropriate standard and reached a
proper decision.3 1 After careful review, the Fourth Circuit held
that the ARB applied a different standard than commonly applied
in determining whether a protected activity existed and thus
breached the APA's reasoned decisionmaking standard, which re-
sulted in an inconsistency.3 2 As such, the court remanded the case
with instructions that it be decided consistent with the court's
opinion. 33
III. BACKGROUND
A. The Clean Air Act
The CAA's goal is to reduce air pollutants that cause health
and environmental risks by setting limits on the amount of pollu-
tants reaching the air.3 4 The statute also establishes a step-by-step
approach for the EPA to follow in obtaining this goal, which entails:
(1) identifying and listing the harmful air pollutants; (2) identify-
ing and listing the sources of the pollutants and (3) creating regula-
tions to deal with the pollutants.35 A recent 1990 amendment
created a stricter enforcement policy, whereby companies violating
a regulation are fined regardless of the reason underlying their
violation. 36
In 1000 Friends of Maryland v. Browner (1000 Friends) y3 a case
providing a detailed discussion of the importance of compliance
with the CAA, the court described the CAA as a "comprehensive
31. See id. (citing Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Nat'l Labor Relations
Bd., 522 U.S. 359, 376 (1998)) (stating that if "clearly understood legal standards"
are not applied, such as "good-faith reasonable doubt and preponderance of the
evidence," judicial rule will be impeded). See also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-45 (1984) (explaining deferential stan-
dard to be applied in cases where ARB's decision is to be reviewed).
32. See Knox, 434 F.3d at 725 n.4 (explaining how court found in favor of Mr.
Knox). When granting petition for review, the court cited Allentown, where the
Court held that the ARB's application of a different standard of review was a
breach of APA requirements. See Allentown, 522 U.S. at 374.
33. See Knox, 434 F.3d at 725 (providing court's decision to review Mr. Knox's
claim).
34. See EPA, Plain English Guide to the Clean Air Act, http://www.epa.gov/
oar/oaqps/peg-caa/pegcaain.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2007) (explaining EPA's
objectives in removing harmful air pollutants).
35. See EPA, Plain English Guide to the Clean Air Act: Features of the 1990
Clean Air Act, http://www.epa.gov/oar/oaqps/pegcaa/pegcaa02.html (last vis-
ited January 17, 2007) (discussing process in which EPA regulates and controls
harmful air pollutants).
36. See id. (providing enforcement policy for violators).
37. 265 F.3d 216 (4th Cir. 2001).
20071
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program for controlling and improving the nation's air quality."38
Overall, the CAA seeks to protect public health and welfare. 39 It
allows the EPA to identify harmful substances in the air and set na-
tional ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) for state compli-
ance. 40 As such, the states must establish a state implementation
plan that meets the NAAQS in order to avoid a CAA violation. 41
B. The CAA Whistleblower Provision: Section 762242
The whistleblower provision protects employees who abide by
and enforce the CAA's goals. 43 The goals are to protect the public
from harmful air pollutants and employees from an employer's re-
taliatory measures, which may include wrongful discharge and dis-
crimination in "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment."44 As evidenced in Varnadore v. Secretary of Labor
(Varnadore),45 the CAA is one of many federal statutes containing a
whistleblower provision to protect employee whistleblower activi-
ties.46 The statute specifically aims to deter wrongful discharge or
discrimination of an employee for reporting harmful substances re-
leased or likely to be released into the "ambient air."47
38. See id. at 220 (explaining purpose of CAA).
39. See id. (explaining goals of CAA).
40. See id. (explaining function of CAA).
41. See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7407(a) (2006)) (providing state implementa-
tion plans should identify way in which "national primary and secondary ambient
air quality standards will be achieved and maintained" within "air quality control"
territory in that state).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 7622 (2006).
43. See id. § 7622(a) (describing actions that CAA whistleblower provision
protects).
44. See Knox v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 434 F.3d 721, 724 (4th Cir. 2006) (citing
whistleblower provision to provide function and purpose thereof). See also 1000
Friends of Maryland v. Browner, 265 F.3d 216, 220 (4th Cir. 2001) (explaining that
CAA was created to keep public safe from harmful air pollutants); Varnadore v.
Sec'y of Labor, 141 F.3d 625, 627 (6th Cir. 1998) (listing various actions that sur-
mount to retaliation).
45. 141 F.3d 625 (6th Cir. 1998).
46. See id. at 626 (deciding whistleblower claims for violation of seven environ-
mental statutes). See also Daniel Riesel & Dan Chorost, When Regulatory Universes
Collide: Environmental Regulation in the Workplace, 13 N.Y.U. EurI. LJ. 613, 617 n.21
(2005) (providing that CERCLA applies to situations where "there is a release or
substantial threat of release" of harmful substances). See generally Lucian T. Pera,
Lawryers as Whistleblowers: A Quick Tour of the Emerging Law of Retaliatory Discharge of
In-House Counsel, LITIGATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SE-
RIES, 735 PLI/Lit 619, 627 (2006) (listing various federal statutes implementing
whistleblower provisions, thereby showing effort made to protect whistleblower ac-
tivities in various forms).
47. See 42 U.S.C. § 7622(a) (describing actions that CAA whistleblower provi-
sion protects).
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Federal regulations define "ambient air" as "that portion of the
atmosphere, external to the buildings, to which the general public
has access. "48 United States v. Grace (Grace) ,49 holding that evidence
of indoor releases was not admissible, cited existing case law and
EPA regulations that maintain "ambient air" is "air exterior to
buildings and accessible by the public. '50
C. The Proper Standard for Reviewing Asbestos Whistleblower
Cases
As stated in Wilkins v. Saint Louis Housing Authority (Wilkins),51
the general standard applied in whistleblower cases is reasonable
belief, a standard that comes from the specific wording in the provi-
sions and the anti-retaliation principle behind such provisions. 52
1. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense
Council, Inc. (Chevron) 53 and the "Deferential
Standard"
The Chevron deferential standard, which is a generally applied
standard in statutory interpretation, entails a two-step analysis. 54
The first step involves a court deciding "whether Congress has di-
rectly spoken to the precise question at issue," and the second step
depends on whether Congress has spoken to the question at issue. 55
If Congress has spoken to the question, the court should adhere to
Congress's intent; if not, the court should answer "whether the
agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute."56
48. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 50.1(e) (2006) (defining ambient air); Varnadore, 141
F.3d at 626 (involving whistleblower claims for violation of seven environmental
statutes). See generally Pera, supra note 46, at 627 (listing various federal statutes
that feature whistleblower provisions and discussing federal efforts to protect
whistleblower activities in various contexts).
49. 455 F. Supp. 2d 1172 (D. Mont. 2006).
50. See id. at 1174-75 (referring to various cases and existing EPA regulations
that address definition of "ambient air").
51. 314 F.3d 927 (8th Cir. 2002).
52. See id. at 933 (citing Moore v. Cal. Inst. of Tech. Jet Propulsion Lab., 275
F.3d 838, 845 (9th Cir. 2002)) (discussing its interpretation of Title VII and policy
against retaliation).
53. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
54. See id. at 842-43 (explaining two-step analysis involved in application of
"deferential standard").
55. See id. at 842 (quoting court's discussion of first step).




Suh: Knox v. United States Department of Labor: The Potentially Risky
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2007
270 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAw JouRNAL [Vol. XVIII: p. 263
2. Allentown Mack Sales & Services, Inc. v. NLRB
(Allentown) 57 and the Reasoned Decisionmaking
Requirement
Following the Chevron standard, Allentown provided that the
APA required administrative agencies to exercise reasoned deci-
sionmaking.58 As found in Allentown, the ARB would be commit-
ting a notable breach by violating the reasoned decisionmaking
requirement under the APA.59 The court noted "[t] he evil of a de-
cision that applies a standard other than the one it enunciates
spreads in both directions, preventing both consistent application
of the law by subordinate agency personnel (notably ALJ's), and
effective review of the law by the courts."60 APA section 5851 allows
the court to overturn the ARB's decision if it is either "unsupported
by substantial evidence" or "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discre-
tion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law."6 1
3. United States v. Ho (Ho) 6 2 and Work Practice Standards
Ho discussed the EPA's right to establish "work practice stan-
dards" to control harmful pollutants, such as asbestos, under CAA
section 112 and other relative regulations.63 In Ho, when the build-
ing owner in question did not follow the work practice standards,
he violated a federal statute and federal regulations on asbestos re-
moval, which resulted in his criminal conviction.64 Similarly in
United States v. Shaw (Shaw),65 Shaw violated several work practice
standards for improper asbestos removal during the demolition of a
57. 522 U.S. 359 (1998).
58. See Knox v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 434 F.3d 721, 724 (4th Cir. 2006) (citing
Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 522 U.S. 359, 376
(1998)) (providing standard of review).
59. See Allentown, 522 U.S. at 374 (emphasizing severity of ARB's application
of different standard deviating from required reasoned decisionmaking standard).
60. See id. at 375 (discussing application of correct standard).
61. See 42 U.S.C. § 585] (c) (1) (2006) (providing appropriatc standard of re-
view to be applied); see also Shirani v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 187 F. App'x 631, 633
(7th Cir. 2006) (providing proper standard to apply in whistleblower actions where
court is reviewing administrative agency's decision).
62. 311 F.3d 589 (5th Cir. 2002).
63. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(h) (1) (2006) (allowing EPA to create "work practice
standards" instead of creating emission standards, thus providing leniency for find-
ing asbestos violations); see also Knox, 434 F.3d at 724 n.3 (citing Ho, 311 F.3d at
601-02) (demonstrating that asbestos does not have to be in ambient air for em-
ployer to violate CAA).
64. See Ho, 311 F.3d at 595 (relaying consequences of violating work practice
standards).
65. 150 F. App'x 863 (10th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2039 (2006).
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building, which resulted in the company's criminal conviction. 66
When the Shaw court found violations regardless of whether there
was proof of asbestos in the ambient air, the court reinforced the
flexibility of finding an asbestos violation.67
4. Passaic Valley Sewerage Commission v. United States
Department of Labor (Passaic Valley) 68 and Broad,
Good Faith Statutory Interpretation
In Passaic Valley, where an employee made "intracorporate
complaints," the court interpreted the statute broadly so as to be
consistent with the statute's purpose and legislative history.69 "The
whistle-blower provision was enacted for the broad remedial purpose
of shielding employees from retaliatory actions taken against them
by management to discourage or to punish employee efforts to
bring the corporation into compliance with the Clean Water Act's
safety and quality standards."70 In addition, the Supreme Court has
allowed such protection because it "prevent[s] the Board's chan-
nels of information from being dried up by employer intimidation
of prospective complainants and witnesses." 71 As such, even ill-
formed complaints are found acceptable, so long as they are made
in good faith. 72
5. Shirani v. United States Department of Labor (Shirani)7 3
and the Sufficient Connection Requirement
In the Shirani case, however, the Seventh Circuit set a limit on
the extent to which a protected activity can be found by rejecting a
plaintiff's whistleblower action for being "too amorphous" and lack-
ing a sufficient connection between the protected activity and the
66. See id. at 869 (evidencing violation of work practice standards constituting
violation of federal regulations).
67. See id. at 883 (finding asbestos violation after testing samples of insulation
found in building that contained asbestos); see also Ho, 311 F.3d at 592 (finding
asbestos violation when noting that building was unsealed and fireproofing was not
wetted as required by regulation when asbestos was removed).
68. 992 F.2d 474 (3d Cir. 1993).
69. See id. at 478 (finding more than one possible interpretation of statute).
70. See id. (emphasis added) (discussing importance of broad interpretation
of whistleblower provision in environmental statutes).
71. See id. at 479 (citing National Labor Relations Board v. Scrivener, 405 U.S.
117, 122-23 (1972)) (providing Supreme Court's view on statutory interpretation
of whistleblower statute).
72. See id. at 478 (discussing acceptability of interpreting whistleblower stat-
utes broadly).
73. 187 F. App'x 631 (7th Cir. 2006).
20071
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retaliatory measure.74 The Seventh Circuit distinguished job trans-
fer rejections, terminations and demotions from sexual harass-
ment.75 The court further noted that the former acts are single acts
that may not constitute a valid claim in court while sexual harass-
ment is considered a continuing act that is "so covert that its dis-
criminatory character is not immediately apparent," yet ultimately
deserves adjudication. 76 In conclusion, the Seventh Circuit found
that the whistleblower claim was tenuous and ruled against the
plaintiff.
7 7
D. Asbestos: A Deadly and Dangerous Pollutant
CAA section 112(b) (1) lists asbestos as a "hazardous air pollu-
tant. '78 Asbestos has been reported to cause serious health
problems, such as mesothelioma, which is a "brutal cancer whose
only known cause is asbestos" and is not the only destructive disease
caused. 79 Mesothelioma alarmingly kills two to three thousand peo-
ple every year.80 Further, asbestos causes non-cancerous conditions
that can debilitate an individual or lead to death.81
Not realizing the extent of harm that asbestos causes, certain
industries or businesses have conducted fraudulent asbestos re-
moval; in other words, they have taken illegal shortcuts leaving as-
bestos for possible future exposure. 82 For this reason, section
112(b) (1) lists asbestos as a hazardous air pollutant.83 Further, the
CAA allows regulations providing flexibility in finding an asbestos
74. See id. at 633-34 (explaining that claims need to be supported by concrete
evidence of discriminatory actions).
75. See id. at 634 (citing Place v. Abbott Labs., 215 F.3d 803, 808 (7th Cir.
2000)) (differentiating single acts from continuing acts in context of finding valid
whistleblower claim).
76. See id. (citing Abbott Labs., 215 F.3d at 808) (describing difference between
single acts and continuing acts for purposes of finding valid whistleblower claim).
77. See id. (explaining Shirani's claim was too tenuous to be protected activity
under whistleblower provision).
78. See United States v. USA Remediation Servs., Inc., No. 02-CR-171E, 2005
WL 906490, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2005) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1) (2006))
(listing asbestos as hazardous air pollutant).
79. See Patrick M. Hanlon, Developments in Premises Liability Law 2005, 2005
SL041 ALI-ABA 665, 667-68 (describing serious health risks created by asbestos
exposure).
80. See id. at 667 (providing statistical data showing large number of people
dying from asbestos exposure).
81. See id. at 668 (listing other serious health risks resulting from asbestos
exposure).
82. See Craig A. Benedict, Ripping and Running: The Large Scale Defrauding of the
Public by the Asbestos Abatement and Related Industries: A Prosecutor's Prospective, 2004
SK019 ALI-ABA 85, 89 (stating illegal shortcuts were common).
83. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1) (2006) (listing hazardous air pollutants).
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violation; specifically, CAA section 114(a) allows the EPA to create a
reporting requirement that, when violated, evokes CAA section 113
"imposi[ing] criminal penalties" on violators.84
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
The Fourth Circuit considered two issues in its decision to
grant the petition for review: (1) whether the ARB applied the ap-
propriate standard and (2) whether the statute and relevant federal
regulations were properly interpreted when applied to Mr. Knox's
situation.8 5 Specifically, the first issue dealt with whether the ARB
applied the appropriate standard when determining that Mr.
Knox's knowledge of the existence of asbestos and subsequent re-
porting did not constitute a protected activity under the CAA.86
The second issue considered whether the ARB correctly found Mr.
Knox's activities unprotected under the CAA because his observa-
tion of the asbestos in the building was not necessarily proven to be
"released in the ambient air" with respect to existing work practice
standards.8 7
A. The Proper Standard: Reasonable Belief
Under the APA, the ARB is expected to use reasoned decision-
making by applying the "clearly understood legal standards" as
stated in Allentown."8 In Knox, the ARB contended that it used rea-
soned decisionmaking when applying the regularly accepted "defer-
ential standard" provided in Chevron and, as such, expected Mr.
Knox to have properly conveyed the release of asbestos into the
ambient air to be protected under the CAA.8 9 The Fourth Circuit
rejected the ARB's contention and found that the standard the
84. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 61.150 (2007) (stating standards for asbestos removal
does not necessarily require asbestos in ambient air); see also United States v. Ho, 311
F.3d 589, 594-95 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 7413, 7414(a) (2006)) (ex-
plaining reporting requirement of section 114(a)). The EPA created a work prac-
tice standard requiring individuals to report asbestos findings and stated criminal
penalties for reporting requirement violators. See id. at 595.
85. See Knox v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 434 F.3d 721, 723-25 (4th Cir. 2006) (dis-
cussing importance of applying proper standard and construing statute with refer-
ence to relevant regulations to be consistent with APA requirements).
86. See id. at 724-25 (discussing APA's requirement for reasoned decision-
making and applying proper standard to reach fair decision).
87. See id. at 724 (showing overly strict interpretation of statute when consid-
ering existing asbestos regulations).
88. See id. (citing Allentown Mack Sales & Serw., Inc. v. Nat ' Labor Relations Bd.,
522 U.S. 359, 376 (1998)) (providing that administrative agencies should apply
regularly accepted legal standard when reviewing cases).
89. See id. at 724 (discussing applicable standard).
2732007]
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ARB applied was improper with respect to an asbestos case. 90 The
court reasoned that because federal statutes and regulations allow
the creation of "work practice standards" for handling hazardous
substances such as asbestos, violations of the CAA's whistleblower
provision could result in more than one fashion. 91
The court observed that the ARB initially announced that the
standard being applied was the reasonable belief standard, yet the
ARB actually applied a different, heightened standard that was in-
consistent with the trend of the statutes and regulations.92 Specifi-
cally, the ARB failed to apply the well-accepted "reasonable belief'
standard and inappropriately sought a stricter standard, which re-
quired Mr. Knox to prove that he "actually conveyed his reasonable
beliefs to management. ' 93 Therefore, the court concluded that the
ARB failed to use reasoned decisionmaking when failing to apply
the well-accepted reasonable belief standard that it had initially ac-
knowledged as the applicable standard. 94
B. Appropriate Application of the CAA
In Knox, the Fourth Circuit found a flaw in the ARB's rigid
requirements concerning Mr. Knox's conduct when determining
whether the CAA protected his activities of reporting asbestos in
the workplace.9 5 Specifically, the ARB provided the definition of
the term "ambient air" as "air external to buildings" and discounted
air in the workplace, and it found that Mr. Knox's activity was not
protected under the CAA.96 As such, the ARB rejected Mr. Knox's
claim.9 7
Regarding the "reasonable belief' standard applied in asbestos
cases, the court found the ARB's interpretation of "release into am-
bient air" too restrictive when the ARB found "the presence of as-
90. See Knox, 434 F.3d at 724 n.3 (noting standard applied in these circum-
stances inappropriate).
91. See id. at 724 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7412(h)(1) (2006)) (allowing work prac-
tice standards to help control hazardous substances such as asbestos).
92. See id. at 725 n.4 (disapproving ARB's shift in standards); see also Passaic
Valley Sewerage Comm'r v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 992 F.2d 474, 478-79 (3d Cir.
1993) (discussing proper statutory interpretation).
93. See Knox, 434 F.3d at 725 (discussing ARB's inappropriate application of
heightened standard).
94. See id. at 725 n.4 (finding that ARB did not apply correct standard).
95. See id. at 725 (discussing ARB's reasoning upon rejecting Mr. Knox's
claim, which was ultimately found inappropriate).
96. See id. (providing ARB's interpretation of ambient air used in its analysis).
See also 40 C.F.R. pt. 50.1 (2007) (defining ambient air).
97. See Knox, 434 F.3d at 724-25 (demonstrating ARB's overly strict require-
ment for Knox to convey asbestos being emitted into air).
12
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bestos in the workplace generally" was not sufficient evidence of a
protected activity.98 Further, the ARB acknowledged, but rejected
Mr. Knox's testimony concerning the proximity of the exhaust fan
to the asbestos as further proof of the likelihood of harmful pollu-
tants being emitted into the air.99 Mr. Knox's reasonable belief that
the asbestos was being emitted into the ambient air was found to be
proper evidence of a protected activity under the CAA, but none-
theless was rejected. o00 In sum, the Fourth Circuit found the strict
interpretation of the phrase "release into ambient air" defeated the
purpose of the CAA to protect the public from harmful air
pollutants.10 1
In further support of the court's holding were CAA regulations
allowing "work practice standards" to be established such that,
when broken, they created a CAA violation. 10 2 The court referred
to CAA section 112, which allowed the EPA to create work practice
standards to protect against asbestos, and to Ho, which examined
work practice standards applicable to asbestos situations and ex-
plained how actual release into the ambient air may not be neces-
sary for a CAA violation to exist.103 The allowance of work practice
standards removed the necessity for asbestos to be in the ambient
air for a CAA violation to exist. 10 4 Federal regulations specifically
reflect instances in which a violation could result without asbestos
being released into the ambient air.10 5 As such, the court was "not
convinced that a reasonable belief of a release into the ambient air
[was] even the correct standard in all cases under the whistle-
blower provision of the CAA."106
98. See id. at 725 (stating that Mr. Knox's evidence and testimony showed rea-
sonable belief of release into ambient air, yet ARB still rejected Mr. Knox's claim).
99. See id. at 723 (providing account of Mr. Knox's testimony that ARB ob-
served and rejected).
100. See id. at 723-25 (discussing flexibility in interpreting "ambient air").
101. See id. at 724-25 (discussing ARB's inappropriate construction of CAA
whereby "release into ambient air" was construed as actual release that Mr. Knox
witnessed and reported).
102. See Knox, 434 F.3d at 724 n.3 (noting additional ways to violate CAA
when work practice standards are in place and thus showing flexibility in finding
protected activity).
103. See id. (noting flexibility in finding CAA violation).
104. See id. at 724 n.3 (showing release of asbestos into ambient air is not
necessary for violation to occur because of serious harm such release causes).
105. See id. (citing 40 C.F.R. pt. 61.150 (2007)) (stating violation can occur
without asbestos released into ambient air).
106. See id. at 724 n.3 (evidencing ability to interpret asbestos violations
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After the Fourth Circuit considered the CAA's guiding princi-
ple, regulations created to broaden the finding of a violation and
history providing flexibility in finding protected activities, the court
found the ARB's conclusion that Knox's activities were unprotected
improper. 10 7 Specifically, the ARB was overly technical when it
found Mr. Knox's complaint to be unprotected activity for solely
stating that asbestos was present, but not "being emitted into the
ambient air," because protected activity also includes the potential
for asbestos to be emitted into the ambient air in view of work prac-
tice standards.108
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
In view of the serious harm asbestos causes and the CAA's goal
to protect the public from dangerous air pollutants, the Fourth Cir-
cuit's decision to allow review of Mr. Knox's whistleblower action is
proper. 10 9 The following portions of the court's analysis were
sound: (1) its basis for finding that in asbestos cases courts should
apply a "reasonable belief" standard and not the ARB's more partic-
ular and stricter standard requiring a conveyance of reasonable be-
lief and (2) its decision that flexibility exists when finding a
violation of the CAA, thereby broadening the scope of protected
activity and furthering the guiding principle of the CAA. 110
First, the APA provides that administrative agencies should ap-
ply the "clearly understood legal standard enunciate [d] in princi-
ple" to reasonably decide a case.' Upon review of (1) the CAA's
goal to protect the public by monitoring the nation's air quality and
providing requirements to maintain a healthy environment; (2) the
general principle behind whistleblower provisions in favor of em-
ployees who are victims of retaliation; (3) the ARB's initial accept-
ance of the well-accepted "reasonable belief' standard and (4) the
107. See Knox, 434 F.3d at 725 (concluding that Mr. Knox's activities were pro-
tected and granting petition for review).
108. See id. at 724 (holding ARB reviewed evidence with inappropriate
standard).
109. See id. at 725 (finding ARB's decision improper due to improper analysis
and granting petition for review).
110. See id. at 723-25 (discussing applicable standard in asbestos cases and
properly finding protected activity).
111. See id. at 724 (citing Allentown Mack Sales v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 376
(1998)) (discussing appropriate application of legal standard involves reasoned
decisionmaking).
14
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [2007], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol18/iss2/4
2007] INTERPRETING ASBESTOS STATUTES 277
dangerous health risks created by asbestos exposure, the reasonable
belief standard should have been applied. 112
Applying a reasonable belief standard allows a plaintiff to ob-
tain judicial review where unfair retaliation has occurred. 13 The
court properly noted the inappropriate shift in standards, placing a
heavier burden on Mr. Knox to prove his actions were protected
under the CAA, thus contradicting the whistleblower provision's
purpose. 114 As shown in Passaic Valley, the purpose behind the
whistleblower provision is to provide broad support against unfair
retaliatory measures. 115 Moderation, however, is essential, and
Shirani correctly limits how broadly a statute can be interpreted by
rejecting claims that are "too amorphous."116
Furthermore, according to Allentown, the ARB has the freedom
to use its deference when deciding this case. 117 The ARB in Knox,
however, overstepped the boundaries. 118 Specifically, when the
ARB shifted away from the regularly accepted "reasonable belief'
standard to a stricter standard, it reached a result different than
one it likely would have reached had it not violated the APA's rea-
soned decisionmaking requirement. 119 While the Fourth Circuit
also applied Chevron's deferential standard, it did not go against the
clearly established legal standard in whistleblower cases, one of the
112. See Knox, 434 F.3d at 724 (discussing CAA's guiding principle of protect-
ing against air pollutants that cause harm to public). See also Wilkins v. St. Louis
Hous. Auth., 314 F.3d 927, 933 (8th Cir. 2002) (citing Moore v. Cal. Inst. of Tech. Jet
Propulsion Lab., 275 F.3d 838, 845 (9th Cir. 2002)) (referring to Title VII's anti-
retaliation provision); Hanlon, supra note 79, at 667-68 (describing serious health
risks created by asbestos exposure).
113. See Wilkins, 314 F.3d at 933 (discussing why reasonable belief standard is
appropriate in whistleblower cases).
114. See Knox, 433 F.3d at 725 n.4 (stating that ARB's shift in standard was
inappropriate in asbestos whistleblower case). See also Passaic Valley Sewerage Comm'r
v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 992 F.2d 447, 478 (3d Cir. 1993) (providing that consistency
with statute's purpose and legislative history is important in determining
whistleblower action).
115. See Passaic Valley, 992 F.2d at 478 (emphasizing importance of broadly
interpreting whistleblower provision).
116. See Shirani v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 187 F. App'x 631, 634 (7th Cir. 2006)
(limiting broad interpretation of whistleblower provision to exclude frivolous and
tenuous claims).
117. See Allentown Mack Sales v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 377 (1998) (providing
that while ARB should be given deference when interpreting regulations, APA
standard should limit ARB's discretion).
118. See Knox, 434 F.3d at 724-25 (explaining that under deferential standard
ARB had power to narrowly construe statute, but found ARB's conclusions
improper).
119. See id. (discussing reasoned decisionmaking requirement and ARB's
breach of such requirement).
15
Suh: Knox v. United States Department of Labor: The Potentially Risky
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2007
278 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAw JouRNAL [Vol. XVIII: p. 263
employee's reasonable belief.120 The court appropriately looked at
the various regulations pertaining to asbestos, the CAA itself and to
cases on asbestos, whistleblower provisions and the appropriate
standard of review of administrative agency decisions. 121 Thus, in
asbestos cases, employees falling prey to retaliation for reporting
workplace asbestos problems need only prove they reasonably be-
lieved that asbestos was being or would most likely be emitted into
the air.' 22
In allowing a claim for the likelihood of asbestos admission
into the air, the court referred to specific regulations pertaining to
asbestos.123  Specifically, the court turned to CAA section
112(h)(1), which provides additional avenues of CAA violations,
and Ho, which addressed the asbestos issue with regard to the viola-
tion of work practice standards, allowing flexibility in statutory in-
terpretation in asbestos situations. 124 The ARB inappropriately
strayed from its responsibility of reasoned decisionmaking by apply-
ing a different standard and placing a heavier burden on the plain-
tiff employee. 125
Notable, however, is Grace, a case decided subsequent to Knox,
which reiterated a strict interpretation of the term "ambient air"
that disallowed indoor air or air in a workplace to be considered
"ambient air" and found inadmissible evidence of indoor releases
based on case law and existing federal regulations. 126 This case,
however, did not include whistleblower provisions in its analysis,
thereby missing an entire public policy dimension of protecting em-
ployees from unfair employer retaliation, which was considered in
the Knox decision. 127 In view of the imbalance of power between
the employer and the employee, the court's opinion was reasonable
120. See id. at 724 (discussing applicable standard). See also Wilkins v. St. Louis
Hous. Auth., 314 F.3d 927, 933 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding reasonable belief to be
appropriate standard).
121. See Knox, 434 F.3d at 723-25 (relaying court's thorough analysis of case).
122. See Wilkins, 314 F.3d at 933 (applying reasonable belief standard).
123. See Knox, 434 F.3d at 724 n.3 (stating that court did not believe that as-
bestos must be emitted into air for violation in view of existing regulations).
124. See id. at 724 n.3 (discussing work practice standards protecting against
asbestos).
125. See id. at 724 n.3, 725 n.4 (stating ARB failed to follow its reasoned deci-
sionmaking responsibility).
126. See United States v. Grace, 455 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1174-75 (D. Mont. 2006)
(stating no ambiguity exists in definition of ambient air). See also 40 C.F.R. pt.
50.1(e) (2007) (defining ambient air).
127. See 42 U.S.C. § 7622 (2006) (protecting employees against employer re-
taliation); Grace, 455 F. Supp. 2d at 1172 (deciding that indoor air is not "ambient
air", thereby rendering evidence of indoor release inadmissible).
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with respect to the CAA's goal to protect the public from air pollu-
tants through its whistleblower provision. 128 Specifically with re-
spect to asbestos, which is known to cause serious health risks and
death, the court necessarily maintained the more flexible, well-ac-
cepted "reasonable belief' legal standard to protect the disadvan-
taged employee under the CAA.a29
Overall, the court's holding was consistent with (1) the CAA's
purpose of preventing harmful air pollutants and its whistleblower
provision, which aids in preventing air pollution; (2) the existing
regulations protecting against other means by which asbestos can
pollute the air and (3) cases analyzing the danger of asbestos and
the importance of maintaining a reasonable belief standard in
whistleblower cases. 130 In sum, the court's holding with regard to a
harmful substance like asbestos was reasonable and proper.13 1
VI. IMPACT
The Fourth Circuit's analysis and decision are consistent with
the trend in whistleblower cases. 13 2 In addition to helping promote
anti-retaliatory measures in a relationship with unbalanced power,
the analysis and decision stay in the realm of asbestos-related mat-
ters and are thus not over-reaching.' 33
Although a concern may exist that a protected activity was
found too easily and that employers may face an undue burden, the
scope of Knox will likely only affect similar situations, as the analysis
specifically applies to asbestos issues.' 3 4 Additionally, because the
court's decision granted a petition for review consistent with ex-
isting regulations and the CAA's goals related to asbestos, as long as
128. See Knox, 434 F.3d at 725 (discussing court's granting of petition for re-
view); see also Passaic Valley Sewerage Comm'r v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 992 F.2d 447, 478-
79 (3d Cir. 1993) (discussing importance of broad interpretation of statute consis-
tent with statute's purpose and legislative history to protect whistleblowers).
129. See Knox, 434 F.3d at 725 (discussing court's reasons for remanding case
and applicable standard of review).
130. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(h) (1) (2006) (allowing EPA to create work practice
standards). See also 42 U.S.C. § 7622 (providing employees protection against em-
ployer retaliation); Knox, 434 F.3d at 724 n.3 (citing United States v. Ho, 311 F.3d
589, 594-95 (5th Cir. 2002)) (discussing work practice standards in asbestos situa-
tions); Wilkins v. St. Louis Hous. Auth., 314 F.3d 927, 933 (8th Cir. 2002) (discussing
protection from employer retaliation against employees).
131. See Knox, 434 F.3d at 725 (rejecting ARB's reasoning and decision and
granting petition for review).
132. See id. (rejecting ARB's decision to deny plaintiff's whistleblower claim
with respect to asbestos).
133. See id. (providing decision specifically with respect to asbestos violations).
134. See id. (rejecting ARB's denial of plaintiffs claim).
2007]
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the regulations and CAA guiding principles do not change dramati-
cally, the application of the court's decision in future asbestos
whistleblower cases will most likely be proper.13 5 As such, the ARB
will be responsible for using more caution when specifically han-
dling asbestos whistleblower cases.' 36
Following the Fourth Circuit's reasoning, future asbestos
whistleblower cases will have more flexibility in finding instances of
protected activity under the CAA.137 The court has established that
focusing solely on the statutory language and failing to refer to the
relevant regulations and cases will not properly accomplish the
CAA's goals in protecting the public from harmful air pollutants,
thereby leading to an improper decision.1 38 As a result, the impor-
tance of referring to all necessary resources is confirmed. 13 9 The
flexibility, however, will be kept in bounds as stated in the subse-
quent Shirani case, which held that finding protected activities
should be limited to situations that are not "too amorphous," thus
reiterating the importance of proper review that is not overly broad
or narrow.' 40 The application of the Knox ruling will also be lim-
ited, or even potentially barred by Grace, which disallowed evidence
of indoor releases based on a literal interpretation of "ambient
air."141
Most importantly, however, the Fourth Circuit strongly dis-
agreed with the misapplication of the legal standard. 142 It quoted
Allentown which stated, "[i]t is hard to imagine a more violent
breach of that requirement of [reasoned decisionmaking] than ap-
plying . .. a standard of proof which is in fact different from the
135. See id. at 723-25 (providing court's analysis of case to reach decision to
grant petition for review).
136. See Knox, 434 F.3d at 725 n.4 (citing Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v.
Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 522 U.S. 359, 374 (1998)) (discussing result of applying
wrong standard). The Allentown Court ruled that applying the wrong standard is a
"violent breach" of the APA's reasoned decisionmaking requirement. See id.
137. See id. at 725 (noting appropriate standard). The court found that the
reasonable belief standard, and not "actual convey[ance of] his reasonable be-
liefs," was appropriate in determining whether the CAA protects the actions. See id.
138. See id. at 724 (providing that reference to regulations and other relevant
cases is necessary to achieve proper results).
139. See id. (discussing importance of referring to various sources to reach
proper conclusion).
140. See Shirani v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 187 F. App'x 631, 634 (7th Cir. 2006)
(providing limit to finding protected activity).
141. See United States v. Grace, 455 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1175-77 (D. Mont. 2006)
(discussing inadmissibility of evidence of indoor releases).
142. See Knox, 434 F.3d at 725 (discussing standard ARB should have applied
but did not apply).
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rule or standard formally announced. 1 43 Thus, whether a case
deals with an asbestos whistleblower issue or another whistleblower
issue, the importance of applying the correct legal standard is reit-
erated, thereby reinforcing the idea that decisionmakers must be
sure to apply the proper standard to reach a fair and efficient deci-
sion.'44 In sum, the Knox decision will provide further considera-
tions with respect to asbestos whistleblower actions involving
various statutes, regulations and policy concerns, which aim to pro-
tect employee rights, health and welfare.
Jessica j Suh
143. See id. at 725 n.4 (citing Allentown Mack Sales & Seru., Inc. v. Nat'l Labor
Relations Bd., 522 U.S. 359, 374 (1998)) (emphasizing importance of applying cor-
rect legal standard).
144. See id. at 725 (discussing reasons for remanding case to be reviewed and
decided consistent with well-accepted legal standard of reasoned decisionmaking).
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THE ENVIRONMENTAL HEARING BOARD REVIEW
The Environmental Hearing Board Review provides Casenotes
and Comments reflecting upon decisions of the Pennsylvania Envi-
ronmental Hearing Board and areas of the law pertinent to practi-
tioners before the Board. The Review seeks to contribute to the
practice of and to promote the scholarship of environmental law in
Pennsylvania.
Consisting of five appointed judges, the Environmental Hear-
ing Board is a statutorily created agency with state-wide trial courtjurisdiction over certain environmental cases and appellate jurisdic-
tion over actions of the Department of Environmental Protection.
Appeals from the Board are taken to the Commonwealth Court of
Pennsylvania.
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